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Abstract 
 
The objective of this study is to compare the effect of different types of public 
support for R&D projects on firms’ technological capabilities. We distinguish be-
tween low-interest loans and subsidies and between national and European sup-
port. Using data on 4,407 Spanish firms during the period 2002-2005, we estimate 
a multivariate probit to analyse the determinants of firms’ participation in public 
R&D programmes and, later, the impact of this participation on firms’ technologi-
cal capabilities using different indicators. The results provide evidence of the ef-
fectiveness of all treatments for improving firms’ innovative performance. With 
respect to innovation outputs, apart from the indirect effect of public support by 
stimulating R&D intensity, we also find evidence of a direct effect of participation 
in the CDTI credit system and in the European subsidy programme on the proba-
bility of obtaining innovations and applying for patents. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a great deal of empirical evidence of the impact of public aid on private R&D, with a 
wide variety of countries analysed and methodologies employed to take into account that pub-
lic support can be endogenous (Wallsten, 2000; Busom, 2000; Lach, 2002; Duguet, 2004; 
González, Jaumandreu and Pazó, 2005; González and Pazó, 2008; Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006; 
OECD, 2006; Clausen, 2008; Takalo, Tanayama and Toivanen, 2013). Most papers consider 
only one programme in their analyses and this fact makes it difficult to accurately compare 
the impacts among funding systems, which can differ in their objectives, the national or su-
pranational character of the supporting entity and the funding scheme (Blanes and Busom, 
2004). In this sense, it seems reasonable that their evaluation also provides different results. 
Two exceptions are the papers by García and Mohnen (2010) and Czarnitzki and Lopes- 
Bento (2014). In both cases, the empirical analysis is based on microdata from the Communi-
ty Innovation Survey (CIS). The first one compares the impact of public support from the 
central government and the European Union (EU) on the innovation of Austrian firms, using 
the third wave of the CIS, which covers the years 1998-2000. To measure the effectiveness of 
these programmes, the authors propose a structural model of the endogeneity of innovation 
and of public support for it. The estimation of this model by the method of asymptotic least 
squares suggests that receiving central government support increases the intensity of R&D by 
2.3 percentage points and yields a 2.5 percentage point increase in the share of sales of new to 
firm products. However, EU support is never significant once national support is taken into 
account. 
The study by Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2014) also offers a comparison of the impact of 
national and European funding on innovation intensity and performance. The empirical analy-
sis is based on the German part of the CIS for seven waves but, as the data can only be used 
as pooled cross-sections, to face the endogeneity problem, they apply a variant of a non-
parametric matching estimator. In terms of innovation input, their results provide evidence 
that getting funding from both sources displays the highest impact, while EU subsidies have 
higher effects when the firm receives funding from only one source. As for innovation per-
formance, funding from both sources again yields higher sales of market novelties and patent 
applications, but in this case the impact of national funding is superior when only one type of 
grant is obtained.     
 3
The objective of this paper is to compare the effect of participation within different public 
funding programmes on the technological performance of Spanish firms. This will allow us to 
analyse the relative relevance of two features of public programmes: the national or suprana-
tional character of the financing agency, which is usually associated with the national or in-
ternational character of the R&D project, and the magnitude of reimbursement implied in de-
sign of the public support. Specifically, we consider public programmes based on low-interest 
loans versus national and European innovation subsidies.   
For this purpose, we integrate two data sets. The first one is provided by the Centre for the 
Development for Industrial Technology (CDTI). This public organism grants financial help of 
its own to companies and facilitates access to third-party funds for the execution of both na-
tional and international research and development projects. The second database is provided 
by the National Institute of Statistics (INE) and corresponds to a sample of innovative firms 
from the Spanish Technological Innovation Survey (the Spanish version of the CIS). Overall, 
we compile a homogeneous sample that consists of an unbalanced panel of 13,546 observa-
tions and 4,407 firms for the period 2002 to 2005. Specifically, 2,185 of them have received 
some type of public support for their R&D projects during the period. 
The factors taken into account to apply for a low-interest loan from the CDTI or for a national 
or European subsidy can differ. However, some of them may be the same as those that affect 
the firm’s R&D decision. This fact can generate a bias in the impact of these funding instru-
ments on the innovative performance of firms if the CDTI or other public domestic and for-
eign organisms award firms with a better technological profile.  
To deal with this selection problem, in this paper we follow a two-stage procedure. Firstly, we 
estimate a multivariate probit model to study the determinants of each of the three schemes of 
public support. Then, in a second stage, we analyse how this participation affects the techno-
logical capability of the firms. Specifically, we consider R&D intensity to be technological 
input, and product and process innovations and patent applications to be technological out-
puts. We use Heckman’s treatment effect model to face selectivity and endogeneity problems. 
Our results confirm that the three instruments are effective in enhancing firms’ R&D intensi-
ties. However, the highest impacts correspond to the CDTI credit system and the European 
subsidy programme. As for innovation outputs, there is an indirect effect of public support by 
stimulating R&D intensity that has a positive impact on the generation of innovations and the 
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application for patents. In addition, we find evidence of a direct effect of soft credits and Eu-
ropean subsidies on the probability of obtaining technological outputs.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we highlight how some characteris-
tics of support programmes can justify their different impact on firms’ innovation. In Section 
3, we describe the empirical model and the data. Section 4 shows the estimates and discusses 
the results. Finally, we present key conclusions in Section 5. 
 
2. THE LINK BETWEEN INNOVATION IMPACT AND PROGRAMME 
FEATURES  
Assessing the impact of public support of firms’ R&D projects on innovation inputs or out-
puts requires a clear understanding of the design of public programmes. Although the general 
design of an R&D programme is likely to have an impact on innovation, it is difficult to clear-
ly associate certain design features of R&D programmes with (not directly intended) innova-
tion (European Commission, 2009).  
In this paper, we investigate the role of two specific dimensions of supporting schemes: the 
national versus supranational level of the programme and the reimbursable character of the 
aid. As for the first aspect, why should we expect a different impact of R&D subsidies de-
pending on the government level of the supporting organism? There are at least three reasons. 
First of all, the design of R&D programmes can differ between public agencies of different 
levels of governance, especially when they have specific objectives. These aims can consist of 
stimulating specific groups such as R&D champions (picking-the-winners strategy), SMEs 
with major financial constraints to undertake R&D projects, or companies in sectors with 
large knowledge externalities. In the case of national agencies, the objective could also be the 
technological updating of firms in traditional or declining sectors (see Blanes and Busom, 
2004), where by the agencies try to increase the probability of survival and avoid employment 
losses. And depending on the final objective, selected projects can be more or less market-
oriented or focused on core technologies of participants. For instance, the Framework Pro-
gramme (FP) of the European Union is characterised by the participation of universities and 
research institutes in consortia and the relevance of pre-competitive research, while the Eure-
ka Programme is more market-oriented (Benfratello and Sembenelli (2002).  
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Alternatively, as Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2007) point out, programmes implemented by 
different jurisdictions could be complementary if the agencies coordinate efficiently to take 
into account the nature and extent of spillovers and other relevant market failures. In fact, 
most supra-national policies are justified by the existence of cross-border spillovers and econ-
omies of scale. In this line, Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2007) test whether the Spanish gov-
ernment and the European Commission have different selection criteria for awarding R&D 
subsidies to firms. They conclude that the determinants of firm participation in each pro-
gramme are different, suggesting that these programmes do not systematically overlap ex-
post, as intended ex-ante by policy makers. 
A second argument is related to the different costs of application in each programme 
(Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento, 2014). These application costs are mainly related to bureaucrat-
ic and administrative requirements that are enlarged when the procedure of granting implies a 
negotiation phase. Firms usually perceive this negotiation phase as resource-consuming, de-
laying the timing of the R&D project (Barajas and Huergo, 2010). 
In addition, application costs increase with coordination costs in the case of programmes that 
imply the existence of self-organised consortia, as often happens in supra-national R&D pro-
grammes. The organisation of the network of partners, the formulation of the proposal and the 
daily monitoring of the project usually entail higher overhead costs in time and human re-
sources than in the case of individual R&D projects. 
And a third reason for having different impacts among programmes has to do with the size of 
expected knowledge spillovers. These spillovers refer both to the company's ability to capture 
information flows from the public pool of knowledge (incoming spillovers) and to the ability 
to control information flows out of the firm (outgoing spillovers) to appropriate the returns 
from innovation.  
The measurement of these spillovers is especially complex in cooperative R&D agreements. 
In fact, as Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) find out, there is a significant relation between 
external information flows and the decision to cooperate in R&D, and the level of knowledge 
inflows and outflows is not exogenous to the firm. This element is especially important for 
our analysis, as projects financed through supra-national programmes usually correspond to 
Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) that involve partners from different countries. In this case, the 
technological capabilities of subsidised firms can be affected not only by public aid but also 
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by spillovers of cooperation among partners. However, most papers that study the impact of 
public programmes that support RJVs consider R&D collaboration and R&D public support 
to be an integrated treatment (Benfratello and Sembenelli, 2002; Bayona-Sáez and García-
Marco, 2010; Kaiser and Kuhn, 2012; Barajas, Huergo and Moreno, forthcoming). An excep-
tion is the paper by Czarnitzki, Ebersberger and Fier (2007), who interpret RJVs and subsidies 
as heterogeneous treatments for a sample of German and Finnish firms. Although they find 
that the combination of both treatments has a positive impact on the firm’s R&D expenditures 
or the number of patents, when cooperation and public support are separately analysed, subsi-
dies for individual research do not significantly affect R&D or patenting by German firms. 
The reimbursable character of public support is a second dimension that could affect our 
analysis when comparing the effect of subsidies and loans. In this sense, as perceived by pro-
gramme managers, the existence of private co-funding is highly relevant for innovation im-
pact (European Commission, 2009). Preferential (below market) or low-interest loans in fact 
imply a hidden subsidy in terms of interest savings. However, they are fully compatible with 
fiscal incentives, while subsidies in many cases imply that firms cannot benefit from tax cuts 
that are related to R&D investments. The loans also self-enforce more discipline on the recip-
ients, as they assume the commitment to pay back the principal. The monitoring of the project 
development by the agency is consequently also higher. In addition, the percentage of the 
firm’s budget that is allocated to the project is higher than usual, and it may be easier to obtain 
private financing outside the company (Huergo and Trenado, 2010).  
 
3. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL AND THE DATA 
Following the literature on impact assessment of R&D policies, the implicit question to an-
swer is what the behaviour of a supported firm would have been if it had not received this 
public aid. The problem is that each firm can only be observed either in the status of receiving 
the support or not. Therefore, to measure the effect of public aid on technological capability, 
we have to take into account that participation within a funding programme agency probably 
depends on the same firm characteristics that determine innovative performance. That is, it is 
necessary to take into account both selection and endogeneity problems.  
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Econometric literature has developed several methods in order to solve these difficulties 
(Heckman, 1979; Cerulli and Potì, 2012; Aerts, Czarnitzki and Fier, 2006; Guo and Fraser, 
2010). In this paper, we follow Heckman’s treatment effect model. Initially, a selection equa-
tion for the participation status is estimated for each of the three programmes considered in 
our analysis: the CDTI programme of low-interest credits, the Spanish programme of R&D 
subsidies and the Framework Programme of the European Commission.1Then, we analyse the 
impact of this participation on some variables that measure technological inputs or outputs.  
Specifically, our first equation is devoted to the participation of firm i ( 1 ) i N  in public 
funding programme m ( 1, 2,3)m  during year t ( 1 ) t T and is formalised in terms of a 
multivariate model given by:  
*1  if  0
0  otherwise
    
mit mit m mit
mit
y x u
y  [1] 
, where *mity  is a latent dependent variable, xmit is the set of explanatory variables that can dif-
fer across equations, m is the vector of coefficients and mitu  are the error terms distributed as 
multivariate normal, each with a mean of zero, and variance–covariance matrix V, where V 
has a value of 1 on the leading diagonal and correlations ρjk = ρkj as off-diagonal elements: 
1 12 13
2 12 23
3 13 23
0 1
0 , 1
0 1
 
 
 
                               
it
it M
it
u
u N
u
 
In the second step, we analyse how the participation of the firm in these programmes affects 
its technological profile, distinguishing between innovation inputs and outputs. 
Initially, we deal with R&D intensity as a measure of technological inputs. Following the ap-
proach of Griffith et al. (2006), we believe that, to some extent, all firms make some innova-
tive effort. However, below a certain threshold, the firm is not capable of picking up explicit 
information about this effort and will not report on it. Thus, we estimate a selection model for 
the observed R&D intensity. In particular, we think that we can measure R&D effort *itid  by 
                                                
1 We have information only about financed projects and therefore we cannot distinguish between the firm’s deci-
sion to apply for the aid and the agency selection among the proposals. The main disadvantage of this lack of 
information is that the selectivity problem is not fully considered.  
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the intensity of R&D expenditure itid  only if the firm makes and reports that expenditure. To 
represent this decision to perform and report R&D expenditures, we assume the following 
selection equation:  
3
*
1 1 1 1
1
1 if   ´ 0 
0 otherwise
  

     
it mit m it it
mit
r p z
r ,  [2] 
where itr  is a binary variable that takes the value 1 when the firm invests in (and reports) 
R&D, and 0 otherwise. If the latent variable *itr  is bigger than a constant threshold (which can 
be zero), we then observe that the firm engages in (and reports) R&D activities. In this equa-
tion, mitp denotes the predicted value for the probability of participating within a public fund-
ing programme,2  m  is the parameter that reflects the impact of the different public aid pro-
grammes, 1itz  is a vector of observable explanatory variables, and 1 it  is an idiosyncratic error. 
Conditional on the performance (and reporting) of R&D activities, we can observe the quanti-
ty of resources allocated to this purpose; that is, 
3
*
2 2 2 2
1
´ if 1
0 if 0
  

      
it mit m it it it
mit
it
id p z r
id
r
,  [3] 
where 2itz  is a vector of determinants of the innovative effort, which can differ from those 
determinants that explain the decision to perform and report R&D expenditures, and 2 it  is 
the error term.  
Therefore, we estimate a Heckman model, assuming that the error terms 1 i  and 2 i  follow a 
bivariate normal distribution with a mean equal to 0, variances 21 1   and 22 , and correla-
tion coefficient 12 . This structure allows us to analyse whether the impact of public aid dif-
fers across programmes, not only in the decision to undertake innovation activities but also in 
R&D intensity. 
                                                
2 This predicted value is introduced in percentage in all equations. Therefore, we can interpret estimated 1 m  as 
the increase in the probability of performing R&D when the probability of participating within public funding 
programme m increases in one percentage point.  
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After this, we focus on technological outputs that we measure through binary variables for the 
generation of process and product innovations and for patent application. We formalise the 
production of technological output as follows: 
3
3 3 3
1
´  

  it mit m it it
m
w p z ,     [4] 
where 3itz  is a vector of determinants of the technological outputs, which can differ depend-
ing on the dependent variable considered, and 3 it  is the error term. In some specifications, 
we include the latent R&D effort, idit*, or the lagged R&D effort, idit-1, as an element of vector 
3itz , assuming that the more firms spend on R&D activities, the more likely it is that they will 
obtain technological outputs. In this case, public support can affect innovation outputs directly 
(through m ) or indirectly by increasing R&D intensity. Given that our measures of technolog-
ical outputs are binary variables, this equation is estimated as a Probit model.  
Notice that, in equations [2] to [4], to deal with the selection (and endogeneity) problem, the 
predicted probability of participation in each public programme is considered instead of the 
observed participation status.3  
3.1. The database 
As we mentioned in the introduction, two data sources are used in this paper. The first one is 
the CDTI database of low-interest loans for R&D projects. During the period 2002-2005, the 
CDTI financed three types of projects through soft loans: Technological Development Pro-
jects (TDP), Technological Innovation Projects (TIP) and Joint Industrial Research Projects 
(JIRP). Specifically, we consider 1,787 projects which were granted a low-interest loan by the 
CDTI during this period. These data are especially suitable for our analysis as most of the 
direct R&D support from the Spanish central government is channelled through the CDTI, 
and the CDTI’s main instrument during this period consists of loans at a preferential interest 
rate. 
This information has been completed with a database that was provided by the National Insti-
tute of Statistics (INE) and corresponds to a sample of innovative firms from the Spanish 
                                                
3 In addition, as a robustness test, we estimate equation [4] as a linear probability model using the predicted 
probability of participation in each programme as the instrumental variable of the participation status.    
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Technological Innovation Survey. In this survey, we find complementary information about 
sources of public financial support for innovation activities from the different levels of gov-
ernment. Unfortunately, we do not have access to information related to R&D tax credits. 
This can limit the results of our analysis as, nowadays, the Spanish tax system is considered 
one of the most generous among OECD countries in terms of the tax subsidy rate (OECD, 
2012).4 
For the estimations we have eliminated 48 observations with a ratio of R&D expenditures 
over sales bigger than 10 (more than 1000%); these relate mainly to new firms which have 
initiated their technological activities but have not yet begun to sell their products or services. 
The final sample consists of an unbalanced panel with 4,407 firms (13,546 observations). 
As can be seen in Table 1, around 50% of the firms do not obtain any type of public funding 
in the period, while less than 3% of firms are supported through the three schemes. In these 
sense, notice that our sample is slightly biased towards innovative firms, which have a higher 
propensity to apply for public funding.  
 
Table 1: Distribution of the sample by type of public funding. 2002-2005 
 
 Yearly observations Firms (in period 2002-2005)
No public funding 9,662 (70.1%) 2,222  (50.4%) 
Only CDTI loan 1,108  (8.2%) 635  (14.4%) 
Only national subsidy 1,451 (10.7%) 483  (11.0%) 
Only European subsidy 322  (2.4%) 160  (3.6%) 
CDTI loan & national subsidy 587  (4.3%) 624  (14.2%) 
CDTI loan & European subsidy 32  (0.2%)   25  (0.6%) 
National & European subsidies 324  (2.4%) 144  (3.3%) 
All types of public funding 60  (0.4%) 114  (2.6%) 
 13,546 4,407 
Notes: In column 1, firms are classified according to the year that they are supported or not. In column 2, firms 
are classified considering the whole period. 
 
The selection of explanatory variables in the model is based on previous empirical literature 
and is also determined by the availability of information in our databases. As for firms’ partic-
ipation in public R&D programmes (equation [1]), most papers include measures of the firm’s 
                                                
4A nice exercise associating the use of R&D subsidies and tax incentives by Spanish firms with financing con-
straints can be found in Busom, Corchuelo and Martínez-Ros (2014). They conclude that direct funding and tax 
credits are not perfect substitutes in terms of their ability to reach firms experiencing barriers associated to mar-
ket failures. 
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technological profile, as the chance to apply increases when the propensity to perform R&D 
projects is higher.5 The available information allows us to consider several variables. The first 
one is internal R&D intensity, which we compute as the ratio of internal R&D expenditures 
over total employment. We also define total R&D intensity as total (internal plus external) 
R&D expenditures per employee and the percentage of R&D employment (over total em-
ployment), as a proxy of skilled labour. In our sample, the means of these variables are greater 
in firms that have been awarded a European subsidy than in firms with a national subsidy, and 
superior in these nationally-subsidized firms than in firms with a CDTI loan (see Table 2). 
In addition, we introduce an indicator reflecting whether the firm has technological coopera-
tive agreements. We can distinguish between the kinds of partners, which can be clients, pro-
viders, competitors, consultants and laboratories, other firms of the group, universities, public 
research centres (PRCs) and technological centres. As can be seen in Table 2, the sample 
mean of these indicators is higher for participants in public R&D programmes than for non-
awarded firms. 
We also consider the generation of process and product innovations and the application for 
patents as proxies of technological outputs that can reflect the firm’s innovative intensity and 
technological and commercial success. Again, the sample mean of these variables is higher 
for participants in national and European R&D programmes than in non-supported firms. Re-
garding the sectorial dimension, public-funded firms are relatively more present in high and 
medium-tech service sectors6.  
In addition to the variables that reflect technological features, we also consider in our specifi-
cation other firms’ characteristics that can affect their participation in public R&D pro-
grammes. In this sense, the firm’s size is a usual determinant in most papers which deal with 
the impact of public funding. However, its effect on participation is not clear. SMEs are usu-
ally more affected by innovation-related market failures, so their benefits from public aid 
could be higher. However, large firms usually have more resources with which to undertake 
R&D projects and apply for the aid. In addition, public agencies can be too risk-averse to fi-
nance R&D of small firms.  
                                                
5 See, for instance, Blanes and Busom (2004), González, Jaumandreu and Pazó (2005), Heijs (2005), Clausen 
(2008) or Huergo, Trenado and Ubierna (2015). 
6In Appendix 1, we explain which NACE two-digit industry codes are assigned to each group and present the 
definitions of the variables. In Table A.1 of Appendix 2 we show their main descriptives for the whole sample.  
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Statistics in Table 2 show that firms awarded by the CDTI and firms supported by national 
subsidies are smaller than non-supported companies. However, firms supported by European 
subsidies are bigger than non-participants in public systems. Most observations of the sample 
refer to firms which have between 10 and 50 employees (33,8%) and large firms, with more 
than 200 workers (33,9%). 
A second dimension frequently considered in the literature is the age of the firm. Again, its 
expected effect on participation is ambiguous. More experienced firms (older firms) are more 
likely to use public aid. However, young firms tend to be more financially constrained and, as 
a consequence, they could apply for and receive public aid more frequently. The information 
in our databases allows us to know whether the firm was born during the last three years. If 
this is the case, we consider the firm to be a start-up. Table 2 shows that the percentage of 
start-ups is higher among firms supported by national and international agencies, especially 
by the CDTI.  
Another aspect that should be taken into account is the firm’s competitive position in the ref-
erence market, which could be captured by its market share, the evolution of sales or the ex-
porting activity. The key question here is what to expect. Will firms with more market power 
participate more in public programmes? Regarding international competition, the expected 
answer for exporters would be affirmative, for at least two reasons. Their position in interna-
tional markets could be a signal of their ability to transform innovations into successful prod-
ucts (Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006). Also, they could be facing lower application costs as they 
are more experienced in dealing with bureaucracy compared to non-exporters (Takalo, Ta-
nayama and Toivanen, 2013). In our sample, the presence of firms with foreign activity is 
higher among supported firms, especially by the CDTI (see Table 2). The export intensity is 
also bigger for participants supported by the three systems with respect to non-participants. 
Finally, additional control variables are introduced. Time dummy variables are included, al-
lowing for business cycle effects or changes in national and European agencies’ budgets. As 
an indicator of the ease of access to external capital markets, possibly meaning better 
knowledge of the public aid system, a dummy variable representing the presence of foreign 
capital among shareholders is incorporated. As can be seen in Table 2, there are no significant 
differences between non-funded firms and participants supported by the soft loan system.  
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Table 2: Means of main variables by type of public funding   
 
 
All firms 
Non-supported 
firms 
(1) 
Supported firms  Difference of means testa) 
CDTI  
loan (2) 
National 
subsidy (3) 
European 
subsidy (4) (1) vs (2) (1) vs (3) (1) vs (4) 
Technological characteristics         
- Internal R&D intensity (K€ per employee) 6.7   3.2 12.8 16.6 25.9 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- Internal R&D performer (0/1) 0.592 0.450 0.879 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- Patent application (0/1) 0.170 0.129 0.284 0.304 0.292 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- Percentage of R&D employees (%) 43.1 32.0 66.4 73.4 79.4 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- Process Innovation (0/1) 0.444 0.396 0.575 0.600 0.507 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- Product Innovation (0/1) 0.493 0.421 0.674 0.730 0.609 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- R&D performer (Internal or external) (0/1) 0.625 0.492 0.901 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- Technological cooperation (0/1) 0.340 0.245 0.495 0.650 0.690 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- Total R&D intensity (K€ per employee) 8.2 4.3 15.2 19.8 28.9 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- High and medium-tech manuf. sector (0/1) 0.235 0.193 0.412 0.330 0.249 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- High and medium-tech service sector (0/1) 0.096 0.073 0.103 0.175 0.247 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Other firm characteristics         
- Belonging to a group (0/1) 0.399 0.392 0.467 0.429 0.436 0.000 0.000 0.017 
- Export intensity (Export over sales) 0.171 0.149  0.260 0.229 0.204 0.000 0.000 0.000 
- Exporter (0/1) 0.548 0.511 0.714 0.656 0.569 0.000 0.000 0.002 
- Foreign capital (0/1)  0.115 0.122 0.113 0.095 0.091 0.281 0.000 0.013 
- Public firm (0/1) 0.020 0.019 0.008 0.024 0.045 0.001 0.162 0.000 
- Size (Number of employees)  358.2 375.0 268.0 329.9 587.3 0.000 0.053 0.000 
- Start-up (0/1) 0.032 0.021 0.060 0.055 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.049 
Number of observations  13,546  9,662 1,764 2,422 738    
Notes: The symbol (0/1) means dummy variable. a): p-value of a two-sample difference of means test. This test is a t-test for continuous variables and a two-sample z-test of 
proportions in case of dummy variables. 
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For the same reason, an indicator of business group membership for each firm is considered. 
Agencies might be less willing to finance firms which belong to a group because it is ex-
pected that these firms benefit from the group in terms of having fewer financial restrictions. 
And a dummy variable that represents the presence of public capital is incorporated. Notice 
that a higher proportion of public firms are supported by the European agency. 
With respect to the decision to engage in R&D investment and the determinants of the intensi-
ty of the R&D (equations [2] and [3]), the theoretical literature suggests including variables 
related basically to technological environment, market conditions, financial constraints, ap-
propriability of technological returns and size (reflecting R&D economies of scale) as deter-
minants (see, for example, Arvanitis and Hollenstein, 1994; Klepper, 1996). 
To capture environmental and demand conditions, we have considered one indicator of the 
firm’s export character, the export intensity and time dummies. We expect that firms operat-
ing in competitive international markets have more incentives to innovate and therefore to 
invest in R&D. 
As for financial restrictions, the high level of risk of R&D projects and the existence of in-
formation asymmetries between firms and suppliers of external finance increase the firms’ 
dependence on internal funds (Hall, 2002). Therefore, firms with liquidity constraints are ex-
pected to have more difficulties undertaking R&D projects. The evidence about the impact of 
financial restrictions on investment effort is mixed. Previous studies for the Spanish economy 
point out that, since 2000, the investment effort has been superior in firms that won public 
support than in those which applied for it without success, and greater in the latter than in 
firms that did not apply for it. Unfortunately, we do not have information about firms’ finan-
cial conditions in our database.7 However, given the aim of this paper, special attention is 
devoted to a firm’s participation in the CDTI low-interest loan programme and national and 
European innovation subsidies schemes. These public aid instruments could increase the 
chances of performing R&D, as tools that reduce a firm’s financial constraints.  
                                                
7The Spanish Technological Innovation Survey includes information about the relative importance assigned by 
firms to the lack of funds in the firm or group, the lack of external financing or the existence of high innovation 
costs as factors that hamper innovation. However, this information was not provided in the selection of variables 
that the INE gave us to do this research. 
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To indicate appropriability conditions, we use the proportion of R&D employees in the firm 
as a measure of human capital. We think that those firms with more qualified personnel are 
more capable of assimilating new knowledge, whether it is developed internally or externally. 
Piva and Vivarelli (2009) provide evidence that supports this hypothesis for a panel of Italian 
firms. As expected, and as can be seen in Table 2, supported firms present a higher percentage 
of R&D employment than non-financed firms. In addition, following previous papers for the 
Spanish economy, we introduce industry dummies that can also approximate sectorial 
technological opportunities and appropriability conditions (Beneito, 2003; Ortega-Argilés, 
Moreno and Suriñach-Caralt, 2005). Specifically, we included the dummies for firms that 
belong to high and medium-tech sectors defined previously. 
Along with the above variables, the specification includes indicators to capture differences in 
the firms’ investment behaviour in terms of the time of permanence in the market. In 
particular, an indicator of newly born firms (start-ups) is included. Empirical evidence 
suggests that start-ups are usually among the most innovative firms; their survival probability 
as well as their growth rate depends strongly on their innovative behaviour (Audretsch, 1995; 
Huergo and Jaumandreu, 2004). Finally, as in equation [1], we include as control variables 
some factors related to firms’ organisational aspects: belonging to a group, foreign capital, 
public capital and technological cooperation. 
With respect to the technological output equation [4], we try three different specifications. In 
the first, we consider almost the same explanatory variables as in the technological input 
equation [3]. In the other two specifications, besides the variables that reflect participation in 
public programmes and time, size and sectorial dummies, some measure of the R&D intensity 
is added as an explanatory variable. This allows us to discuss the existence of direct and indi-
rect effects of public funding. 
 
4. RESULTS 
In this section, we present the results of the estimation of equations [1] - [4] depicted in Sec-
tion 3. We begin with the explanation of participation in public aid programmes. Later, we 
analyse how participation in these programmes affects the technological performance of the 
firms, distinguishing between innovation inputs and outputs. 
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4.1. The determinants of participation in public R&D programmes 
Table 3 shows the estimation of the determinants of firms’ participation in public aid pro-
grammes. Considering that we have information about three systems of public aid, we use a 
multivariate probit model (seemingly unrelated probit model).8 Some of the explanatory vari-
ables are included with one lag in the estimates to prevent endogeneity problems.  
As expected, the correlation coefficients ρ21and ρ32 are significantly different from zero and 
positive. In accordance with Busom and Fernández-Ribas (2007) and Czarnitzki and Lopes- 
Bento (2014), national support and European funding are positively linked to each other. The 
same happens with soft loans and national subsidies, indicating the presence of common un-
observed factors that affect the probability of participating in both programmes. A positive 
shock on the likelihood of being awarded an EU grant and a CDTI loan would also translate 
into a positive shock in the probability of getting a national subsidy. However, ρ31 is non-
significant, implying that there are no common unobserved factors affecting the probabilities 
of participating in the national soft loan system and the scheme of European subsidies. At this 
respect, in our very short panel most of non-supported firms in one year remain in the same 
status the following year, while awarded firms tend to change the specific type of public aid 
they achieve from one period to the next (see Table A.2 of Appendix 2).9  
As for the explanatory variables, most of them are statistically significant and their coeffi-
cients have the same sign in all columns. However, the joint chi-square test clearly rejects the 
equality of coefficients across equations (p-value=0.000).  
The first fact that can be highlighted from Table 3 is the positive effect of having a higher 
technological profile on the probability of participation in all public aid programmes. The 
internal R&D intensity of the previous year has a statistically positive impact for all kinds of 
funding. Looking at the magnitude of the coefficients, the participation in subsidy pro-
grammes reacts more sensitively to prior innovation experience than in the CDTI loan system.  
                                                
8 See Cappellari and Jenkins (2003). 
9 In particular, among firms awarded both an EU grant and a CDTI loan in year t, about 48%  get a national sub-
sidy in year t+1 (with or without other type of aid). 
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Table 3: Participation in public R&D programmes. Multivariate Probit model 
 CDTI loan  
programme 
 National subsidy  
programme 
 European subsidy  
programme 
 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Technological characteristics       
- Internal R&D intensity (in logs.) (t-1) 0.081 *** 0.006 0.144 *** 0.007 0.107 *** 0.011 
- Patent application (t-1) 0.151 ** 0.045 0.081 * 0.043 0.081  0.061 
- Technological cooperation with:          
 clients (t-1) -0.040  0.067 0.176 ** 0.059 0.230 ** 0.075 
 competitors (t-1) -0.231 ** 0.080 0.214 *** 0.066 0.371 *** 0.078 
 other firms from the group (t-1) -0.047  0.070 -0.076  0.067 0.157 * 0.085 
 providers (t-1) 0.014  0.059 -0.138 ** 0.054 -0.090  0.073 
 consultants & laboratories (t-1) 0.014  0.071 -0.063  0.066 0.007  0.086 
 universities, PRCs and technological centres (t-1) 0.129 ** 0.046 0.609 *** 0.042 0.535 *** 0.061 
- High and medium-tech manufacturing sector 0.282 *** 0.043 0.090 ** 0.043 -0.148 ** 0.066 
- High and medium-tech service sector -0.038  0.070 0.429 *** 0.057 0.481 *** 0.073 
Other firm characteristics       
- Belonging to a group 0.109 ** 0.045 0.098 ** 0.044 0.055  0.066 
- Exporter (t-1) 0.313 *** 0.045 0.040  0.042 0.040  0.061 
- Foreign capital  -0.212 ** 0.061 -0.228 *** 0.062 -0.135  0.090 
- Public firm -0.081  0.166 0.332 ** 0.128 0.634 *** 0.145 
- Size (in logs.) 0.649 *** 0.068 0.154 ** 0.050 -0.118 * 0.065 
- Size squared  -0.059 *** 0.007 -0.010 * 0.005 0.019 *** 0.006 
- Start-up 0.541 *** 0.153 0.230 * 0.136 -0.297  0.200 
ρ21 0.256***  (0.000) 
ρ31 -0.005       (0.885)  
ρ32 0.313***  (0.000) 
Test [CDTI loan-National subsidy] 0.000 
Test [CDTI loan-European subsidy] 0.000 
Test [National subsidy-European subsidy] 0.000 
Log of likelihood function -7187.3 
Number of observations (number of firms) 8716 (3534) 
 
Notes: S.E.: Standard errors. (t-1) denotes that the variable is included with one lag. All regressions include a constant and time dummies for the years 2003 and 2004. Test 
reports the p-value of a test of equality of coefficients. ρ21, ρ31 and  ρ32 (p-values in parentheses) are the correlation coefficients across equations. Coefficients significant at 
1%***, 5%**, 10%*. 
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In addition, having technological agreements in general increases the probability of obtaining 
European funding. This result is coherent with the objectives of the Framework Programme, 
which promotes cooperation between firms of different countries. The European agency is 
especially sensitive to cooperation with competitors and with universities, PRCs and other 
technological centres. A similar effect is obtained for participation in the national funding 
programme with the exception of the cooperation with providers. Our results are in accord-
ance with García and Mohnen (2010), who find that Austrian firms which cooperated in inno-
vation were more likely to get help from both national and EU sources during the period 
1998-2000. A similar result is obtained by Hottenrott and Lopes-Bento (2014) for Belgian 
firms but only for small and medium firms which cooperate with foreign firms. However, 
technological cooperation does not seem to increase the propensity to participate in the soft 
loan programme. Only cooperation with universities, PRCs and other technological centres 
has a positive and significant impact, while cooperation with competitors shows a negative 
effect. 
Being a patent applicant in the previous year positively affects the chance of participation in 
the soft loan and national subsidy systems.10 It seems that the CDTI is especially sensitive to 
the previous technological success of candidate firms in order to award a loan. These results 
are in accordance with the evidence provided by Huergo, Trenado and Ubierna (2015) for the 
same loan system.  
Regarding belonging to a high or medium-tech sector, the results confirm what we observed 
in the descriptives. In fact, high and medium-tech service firms have a higher probability of 
participating in subsidy programmes, while the low-interest loans by CDTI favour firms 
which operate in high or medium-tech manufacturing sectors. 
As for the rest of the firms’ characteristics, being an exporter in the previous year increases 
the probability of participating in the CDTI low-interest loan system but does not affect par-
ticipation in national and European subsidy systems. The presence of foreign capital has a 
negative effect for obtaining national funding. This result suggests that the national govern-
ment is more reluctant to finance firms that belong to foreign groups than to domestic ones. 
García and Mohnen (2010) and Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2014) also find a negative effect 
                                                
10 In a complementary estimation without distinguish among the partners of technological cooperation, patent 
application also affects the participation in the European subsidy system. 
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of this variable on European funding, but in our sample, we do not find this result. Group 
membership does not have a significant effect on European subsidies.  
Another interesting result in Table 3 is the existence of a non-linear effect of size on the prob-
ability of participating in low-interest loan and national and European funding systems, but in 
a different way. As firms are larger, they have a higher probability of being awarded by the 
CDTI and national subsidies, but the increase in size affects the probability of obtaining fi-
nancing marginally less. This result, which is in accordance with Huergo, Trenado and Ubier-
na (2015), suggests that applying for CDTI loans has some costs in terms of time and search-
ing for information, so larger firms have a higher probability of participating, although as a 
certain amount of resources is obtained, the size effect is smaller. However, in line with 
Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2014), the estimated curve describes a U-shaped relationship 
between the European subsidy receipt and firm size.  
Finally, being a start-up positively affects the chance of participation in soft loan and national 
subsidy programmes. Although more experienced firms are more likely to know and use pub-
lic aid programmes, younger firms are usually more financially constrained, having more in-
centives to apply for and receive them. It seems that the second effect exceeds the first one. In 
the case of European public aid it is seems that both effects compensate each other.   
4.2. R&D intensity 
Table 4 shows the results of the estimation associated with equations [2] and [3] explained in 
Section 3. Specifically, we present the marginal effects of the Generalized Tobit model where 
the participation and the intensity equations are estimated consistently by maximum likeli-
hood. All explanatory variables in the first equation are also considered as explanatory varia-
bles in the second equation.  
In order to analyse whether the determinants of internal R&D expenditures differ from the 
determinants of total R&D expenditures, we present the results of the Heckman model for 
both internal and total R&D intensity. Notice that the correlation term rho is significant in 
both estimations, pointing out the necessity of estimating a selection model for the observed 
intensity.  
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Table 4: R&D intensity (in logarithms). Generalized Tobit model 
 Internal R&D  Total R&D  
 Propensity to engage 
in internal R&D (0/1) 
 Internal 
R&D intensity 
 Propensity to engage 
in R&D (0/1) 
 Total 
R&D intensity 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 dy/dx  S.E. dy/dx    S.E.   dy/dx  S.E. dy/dx    S.E. 
Participation in CDTI loan programmea) 0.022 *** 0.003 0.034 *** 0.004 0.022 *** 0.002 0.034 *** 0.004 
Participation in national subsidy programmea) 0.006 ** 0.002 0.022 *** 0.003 0.006 *** 0.002 0.020 *** 0.004 
Participation in European subsidy programmea) 0.017 *** 0.005 0.035 *** 0.004 0.017 *** 0.004 0.039 *** 0.006 
         
Technological characteristics         
- Percentage of R&D employees (t-1) 0.004 *** 0.000 0.002 *** 0.001 0.004 *** 0.000 0.002 ** 0.001 
- Technological cooperation (t-1) 0.059 *** 0.016 -0.379 *** 0.048 0.059 *** 0.022 -0.309 *** 0.044 
- High and medium-tech manufacturing sectors   0.141 *** 0.055   0.167 *** 0.036 
- High and medium-tech service sectors   0.091  0.077   0.092  0.076 
Other firm characteristics         
- Belonging to a group -0.028  0.017 0.069 ** 0.034 -0.028 ** 0.013 0.141 *** 0.031 
- Exporter (t-1) 0.059 ** 0.021 -0.272 *** 0.048 0.055 ** 0.020 -0.298 *** 0.040 
- Foreign capital  0.055 ** 0.019 0.396 *** 0.057 0.053 ** 0.021 0.398 *** 0.057 
- Public firm   -0.449 ** 0.167   -0.503 ** 0.182 
- Size (in logs.) -0.029 *** 0.005 -0.559 *** 0.012 -0.029 *** 0.004 -0.558 *** 0.014 
- Start-up   -0.018  0.102   0.006  0.099 
         
Selection term, rho   0.160 *** 0.024   0.166 *** 0.030 
Log of Likelihood Function -10,501.5 -10,675.8 
Number of observations (number of firms) 8,716 (3,534) 8,716 (3,534) 
 
Notes: a) The prediction of the probability of participating in each programme is obtained from Table 3. S.E.: Bootstrapped standard errors.  Coefficients significant at 1%***, 
5%**, 10%*. Marginal effects (dy/dx) are computed at sample means. For dummy variables, the marginal effect corresponds to change from 0 to 1. All regressions include a 
constant and time dummies for the years 2003 and 2004. 
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Although it is possible to assume that most variables are exogenous, the indicators for being 
an exporter, technological cooperation and the percentage of R&D employees are again intro-
duced with a lag in the decision equation. For the same reason, export intensity is also includ-
ed with a lag in the R&D intensity equation.   
With respect to the decision to engage in R&D, the estimations in columns (1) and (3) show 
that being awarded any type of public support clearly increases the probability of conducting 
R&D activities. Participation in the three kinds of public funding systems raises the probabil-
ity of self-financing internal R&D activities. The highest impact corresponds to soft loans and 
the lowest to the national subsidies. The impact is quite similar when we consider total R&D 
expenditures.11 
Table 4 also shows that most explanatory variables increase the probability of carrying out 
R&D expenditures. Firms which operate in international markets (exporters and firms with 
foreign capital) present a higher probability of engaging in R&D activities. Specifically, firms 
involved in exporting activities during the last year are 5.9 percentage points more likely to 
self-finance internal R&D activities, stressing the complementarity between internationalisa-
tion and R&D investment strategies.  
In addition, the coefficient for the percentage of R&D employment confirms the relevance of 
having qualified workers to more easily assimilate new knowledge. This result is in line with 
Huergo and Moreno (2011), who, with another Spanish database, also find a positive impact 
of human capital approximated by the proportion of engineers and graduates on firms’ innova-
tion behaviour.  
A positive sign is also obtained for technological cooperation, which can also be considered a 
proxy of the firm’s technological capability. Unexpectedly, we find a negative effect of the 
firm’s size on the decision to carry out R&D. Belonging to a group also has a negative impact 
on the probability, but only when total R&D expenditure is considered.  
With respect to magnitude of R&D expenditures, as can be seen in columns (2) and (4), once 
the firm has decided to invest, again the three kinds of public aid stimulate the intensity of 
                                                
11 If instead of introducing the three variables denoting the participation in public programmes simultaneously in 
the equation, we consider a separate equation for the participation in each programme, estimated impacts are 
higher. This evidence points out that, when we do not take into account the correlation in the participation in the 
three programmes, the impacts of this participation could be over-estimated.  
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R&D investment, although the lowest impact corresponds to national subsidies. The effects 
are quite similar when we consider total R&D expenditures. Our results are in line with Gar-
cía and Mohnen (2010) and Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2014), who define R&D intensity as 
the ratio of R&D expenditures over sales. Notice also that European subsidies have a higher 
impact on total R&D intensity than on internal R&D intensity. This suggests that international 
funding is more effective for fostering external R&D activities. 
Belonging to a group and being partly owned by foreign capital also increase the intensity of 
R&D investment. These results are in accordance with Ortega-Argilés, Moreno and Suriñach-
Caralt (2005), Griffith et al. (2006) and Hall, Lotti and Mairesse (2009). As expected, firms 
with higher percentage of R&D employment and firms operating in high and medium-tech 
manufacturing sectors also present greater R&D activity. However, there are not differences 
in the R&D effort of firms operating in high and medium-tech service sectors. The rest of 
explanatory variables negatively affect the R&D intensity.  
4.3. The production of technological outputs 
Tables 5, 6 and 7 show the results of the estimation of equation [4] for three alternative 
measures of innovation outputs: product innovation, process innovation and patent applica-
tion. Given the binary character of our innovation outputs, the equation is estimated as a pro-
bit model.  
As we have explained in Section 3, we consider three alternative specifications to analyse the 
impact of public support on the probability of obtaining technological results. In the first one, 
we consider the same control variables as in the previous equation to be explanatory variables 
and we do not take into account that the technological effort of the firm can increase its 
chance of obtaining a process or product innovation.  
In the other two specifications, R&D intensity is included as an explanatory variable. Notice 
that the innovation effort is presumably endogenous for achieving innovation outputs – that is, 
there can be unobservable (to the econometrician) firm characteristics that incentivise firms to 
invest more in R&D and, at the same time, make them more productive in the use of this ef-
fort. This could generate spurious correlation and upward bias in the coefficient of R&D in-
tensity. To face this problem, in the second specification we interpret the R&D intensity equa-
tion [3] as an instrumental variables equation, and use the predicted R&D intensity obtained 
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from this equation instead of the observed intensity as an explanatory variable in equation [4]. 
However, as the prediction of the probability of participation in public programmes and the 
prediction of the R&D intensity are generated from the same set of explanatory variables, 
there can exist correlation problems. For this reason, in the third specification we substitute 
the prediction of the R&D intensity by the lagged observed R&D intensity. 
When the R&D intensity is not included in the estimates (column (1) of Tables 5, 6 and 7), 
being supported by public programmes clearly increases the probability of obtaining product 
innovations. Again, the highest impact is associated with participation in the CDTI loan sys-
tem. Participation in this programme and in the national subsidy system also raises the proba-
bility of obtaining process innovations, while European funding does not seem to have any 
effect.12  
 
Table 5: Product innovation. Probit model 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 dy/dx  S.E. dy/dx  S.E.  dy/dx  S.E. 
Participation in CDTI loan programmea) 0.016 *** 0.001 0.014 *** 0.002  0.010 *** 0.001
Participation in national subsidy programmea) 0.003 ** 0.001 0.002 ** 0.001  -0.004 *** 0.001
Participation in European subsidy programmea) 0.006 *** 0.002 0.005 * 0.003  0.009 *** 0.002
        
Total R&D intensityb)   0.034  0.038    
Total R&D intensity (t-1)      0.037 *** 0.002
High and medium-tech manufacturing sector 0.012  0.016 0.008  0.013  0.048 *** 0.013
High and medium-tech service sector 0.017  0.019 0.010  0.020  0.040 ** 0.020
Belonging to a group -0.020  0.013 -0.023 * 0.013  -0.007  0.011
Exporter (t-1) 0.039 ** 0.013 0.051 ** 0.018  0.061 *** 0.013
Foreign capital  0.085 *** 0.015 0.070 *** 0.019  0.038 ** 0.017
Public firm -0.072 * 0.037 -0.056  0.048  -0.074 ** 0.035
Size (in logs.) -0.023 ** 0.003 -0.003  0.022  -0.003  0.004
Start-up 0.263 ** 0.112 0.264 ** 0.091  0.322 ** 0.087
Log of Likelihood Function -4,817.4 -4,633.2  -4,817.0 
Number of observations 8,716 8,716  8,716 
 
Notes: a) The prediction of the probability of participating in each programme is obtained from Table 3.b) The 
prediction of the total R&D intensity is obtained from estimations (3) and (4) in Table 4. S.E.: Bootstrapped 
standard errors. Marginal effects (dy/dx) are computed at sample means. For dummy variables, the marginal 
effect corresponds to change from 0 to 1. All regressions include a constant and time dummies for the years 2003 
and 2004. Coefficients significant at 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. 
 
  
                                                
12 The results are quite similar when we compute average marginal effects (AME) instead of evaluating the mar-
ginal effect as sample means.  
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Table 6: Process innovation. Probit model 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 dy/dx  S.D. dy/dx  S.D.  dy/dx  S.D. 
Participation in CDTI loan programmea) 0.008 *** 0.001 0.019 *** 0.002  0.003 ** 0.001
Participation in national subsidy programmea) 0.005 *** 0.001 0.008 *** 0.001  -0.001  0.001
Participation in European subsidy programmea) 0.002  0.002 0.010 *** 0.002  0.004 *** 0.002
        
Total R&D intensityb)   -0.210 *** 0.038    
Total R&D intensity (t-1)      0.035 *** 0.002
High and medium-tech manufacturing sector -0.051 *** 0.017 -0.022  0.018  -0.017  0.015
High and medium-tech service sector -0.102 *** 0.026 -0.060 ** 0.021  -0.079 *** 0.020
Belonging to a group 0.008  0.010 0.031 ** 0.013  0.019  0.013
Exporter (t-1) 0.062 *** 0.015 -0.007  0.020  0.079 *** 0.013
Foreign capital  0.035 * 0.019 0.129 *** 0.025  -0.009  0.020
Public firm -0.007  0.043 -0.106 ** 0.045  -0.010  0.039
Size (in logs.) 0.009 ** 0.003 -0.112 *** 0.022  0.033 *** 0.003
Start-up 0.111 ** 0.050 0.108 * 0.056  0.177 *** 0.051
Log of Likelihood Function -5,407.4 -5,391.4  -5,271.6 
Number of observations 8,716 8,716  8,716 
 
Notes: a) The prediction of the probability of participating in each programme is obtained from Table 3.b) The 
prediction of the total R&D intensity is obtained from estimations (3) and (4) in Table 4. S.E.: Bootstrapped 
standard errors. Marginal effects (dy/dx) are computed at sample means. For dummy variables, the marginal 
effect corresponds to change from 0 to 1. All regressions include a constant and time dummies for the years 2003 
and 2004. Coefficients significant at 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. 
 
 
 
Table 7: Patents application. Probit model 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 dy/dx  S.D. dy/dx  S.D.  dy/dx  S.D. 
Participation in CDTI loan programmea) 0.018 *** 0.001 0.014 *** 0.001  0.017 *** 0.001
Participation in national subsidy programmea) -0.005 *** 0.001 -0.006 *** 0.001  -0.006 *** 0.001
Participation in European subsidy programmea) 0.014 *** 0.001 0.011 *** 0.001  0.014 *** 0.001
        
Total R&D intensityb)   0.067 ** 0.023    
Total R&D intensity (t-1)      0.008 *** 0.002
High and medium-tech manufacturing sector -0.036 *** 0.011 -0.046 ** 0.011  -0.030 ** 0.011
High and medium-tech service sector -0.020  0.015 -0.036 ** 0.015  -0.017  0.015
Belonging to a group -0.044 *** 0.009 -0.052 *** 0.009  -0.042 *** 0.009
Exporter (t-1) -0.053 *** 0.010 -0.030 ** 0.010  -0.049 *** 0.010
Foreign capital  0.084 *** 0.011 0.054 *** 0.015  0.074 *** 0.012
Public firm -0.145 *** 0.036 -0.115 ** 0.042  -0.147 *** 0.035
Size (in logs.) -0.024 *** 0.003 0.015  0.014  -0.018 *** 0.004
Start-up 0.019  0.032 0.019  0.033  0.031  0.028
Log of Likelihood Function -3,294.1 -3,290.9  -3,284.1 
Number of observations 8,716 8,716  8,716 
 
Notes: a) The prediction of the probability of participating in each programme is obtained from Table 3.b) The 
prediction of the total R&D intensity is obtained from estimations (3) and (4) in Table 4. S.E.: Bootstrapped 
standard errors. Marginal effects (dy/dx) are computed at sample means. For dummy variables, the marginal 
effect corresponds to change from 0 to 1. All regressions include a constant and time dummies for the years 2003 
and 2004. Coefficients significant at 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. 
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In addition, the probability of applying for patents is higher for firms awarded a CDTI credit 
or a European grant, but national subsidies negatively affect this probability (see Table 7). In 
this line, Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2014) find that German firms that receive combined 
support from national and European administrations increase their patent applications, while 
this effect disappears when companies are only financed by EU programmes. However, Span-
ish firms rarely use patents to protect their technological results (Barajas, Huergo and More-
no, 2011).13 
As we expected, when the prediction of the R&D intensity is added to the specification, the 
impacts of participating in public programmes are lower, and eventually become non-
significant. R&D intensity has a significant positive impact on the generation of patents appli-
cations, while appears to be no relevant in the case of product innovations and to have a nega-
tive impact on process innovations. However, these counterintuitive results can be explained 
by the correlations among the prediction of the R&D intensity and the predictions of the 
probabilities of participation in the three public programmes, which are generated from the 
same set of explanatory variables. In fact, when the probabilities of participation in public 
programmes are excluded from the specification (see Table A.3 of Appendix 2), the R&D 
intensity has a positive impact on the three technological outputs. The highest effect corre-
sponds to product innovation and the lowest to patents. In this sense, public support has an 
indirect effect by stimulating R&D intensity. 
As an alternative way to control for the potential endogeneity of innovation effort, in the third 
specification we include the observed R&D intensity lagged one period. Now this variable 
shows a positive impact on the generation of the three technological outputs. The results also 
suggest that participating in the CDTI loan programme and in the European subsidy pro-
gramme have a direct positive effect on the probability of obtaining the three technological 
outputs. On the contrary, national subsidies seem to have a negative direct impact. However, 
this last result could be explained by the correlation in the participation among the pro-
grammes.   
With respect to the control variables, being partly owned by foreign capital increases the 
probability of obtaining technological outputs. The rest of the explanatory variables present a 
                                                
13 Again, the results corresponding to separate estimates for the impact of each programme suggest the relevance 
of controlling for the correlation in the participation in the three programmes.  
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different impact depending on the measure of technological output. For example, as in previ-
ous empirical evidence, the youngest firms have a higher probability of innovating, but they 
do not present any difference with respect to the other firms in terms of patent applications.  
Finally, as a robustness test, we estimate equation [4] as a linear probability model using the 
predicted probability of participation in each programme as the instrumental variable of the 
participation status (see Table A.4 of Appendix 2). The results remain almost unchanged.   
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this paper is to compare the effect of participating within different public 
R&D funding programmes on firms’ technological performance. This will allow us to analyse 
the relative relevance of two features of public programmes: the national or supranational 
character of the financing agency and the magnitude of reimbursement implied in the design 
of public support.  
Specifically, for the empirical analysis, we consider three types of instruments used by public 
administrations to support Spanish firms: the programme of low-interest loans provided by 
the CDTI, the main national agency which finances firms’ R&D projects; the national scheme 
of R&D subsidies; and the European system of R&D grants.   
To face the typical selectivity and endogeneity problems that are present in this kind of analy-
sis, we use Heckman’s treatment effect model, following a two-stage procedure. Firstly, we 
estimate a multivariate probit model to study the determinants of participation in each of the 
three public programmes. Afterwards, in a second stage, we analyse how this participation 
affects the technological capability of the firms. Specifically, we consider R&D intensity to be 
technological input, and product and process innovations and patent applications technologi-
cal outputs.  
The results obtained for a sample of 4,407 Spanish firms during the period 2002-2005 can be 
summarised as follows: 
Firstly, participation in national subsidy programmes and participation in European subsidy 
programmes are positively linked to each other. The same happens with CDTI soft loans and 
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national subsidies schemes, indicating the presence of common unobserved factors that affect 
the probability of participating in both programmes. 
Secondly, being awarded public aid clearly increases the probability of conducting R&D ac-
tivities. The highest impact corresponds to CDTI soft loans.   
Thirdly, once the firm has decided to invest in R&D, the three kinds of public aid also stimu-
late the intensity of R&D investment, with national subsidies having the smallest impact. In 
addition, EU grants seem to be the most effective for fostering external R&D activities. 
As for innovation outputs, public support has an indirect effect by stimulating R&D intensity, 
which has a positive impact on innovations and patent applications. In addition, we also find 
that participation in the CDTI loan system and in the European subsidy programme have di-
rect positive effects on the generation of technological outputs.  
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Appendix 1 
DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES 
Belonging to a group: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm belongs to a 
group. 
Exporter: Dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if the company exported during the peri-
od. 
Foreign capital: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 when the firm is partly owned by a 
foreign firm (more than 50% of foreign capital during the period). 
High and medium-tech manufacturing: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the 
company belongs to any high or medium-tech manufacturing sectors (NACE2 codes 24, 29, 
30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35). 
High and medium-tech services: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the company 
belongs to high-tech services (NACE2 codes 64, 72, 73, 92) 
Participation in CDTI loan programme: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the 
firm has been awarded a CDTI soft loan during the year. 
Participation in national subsidy programme: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if 
the firm has been awarded a national subsidy during the year. 
Participation in European subsidy programme: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if 
the firm has been awarded a European subsidy during the year. 
Patent application: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm applied for patents 
during the period. 
Process innovation: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm has obtained a pro-
cess innovation during the last three years.  
Product innovation: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm has obtained a 
product innovation during the last three years.  
Public firm: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 when the firm is partly publicly owned 
(more than 50% of public capital during the period). 
R&D performer: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm has positive expendi-
tures on R&D during the year. 
Internal R&D intensity: Ratio of internal expenditures on R&D over total employment. 
Size: number of employees during the current year. 
Start-up: dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the firm was created during the last 
three years. 
Technological cooperation: Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the company estab-
lished technological cooperation agreements during the last three years with other partners. 
Total R&D intensity: Ratio of total expenditures on R&D (including technology imports) 
over total employment. 
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Appendix 2 
Table A.1: Statistics of main variables 
 
 Mean S.D. Min Max Median 
R&D funding (1/0)      
With own funding  0.563 0.496 0 1 1 
Participation in CDTI loan programme 0.132 0.238 0 1 0 
Participation in national subsidy programme 0.177 0.381 0 1 0 
Participation in European subsidy programme 0.054 0.227 0 1 0 
Percentage of funding (%)      
Own funding  50.5 47.1 0 100 63.0 
Funded with a national subsidy 5.6 17.1 0 100 0 
Funded with a European subsidy 1.9 11.6 0 100 0 
Other firm characteristics (1/0)      
Belonging to a group 0.399 0.490 0 1 0 
Exporter 0.548 0.498 0 1 1 
Foreign capital  0.115 0.319 0 1 0 
High and medium-tech manufacturing sector 0.235 0.424 0 1 0 
High and medium-tech service sector 0.096 0.295 0 1 0 
Internal R&D performer   0.592 0.491 0 1 1 
Patent application 0.171 0.377 0 1 0 
Process Innovation 0.444 0.497 0 1 0 
Product Innovation 0.494 0.500 0 1 0 
Public firm 0.020 0.139 0 1 0 
R&D performer (Internal and external) 0.625 0.484 0 1 1 
Start-up 0.032 0.172 0 1 0 
Technological cooperation with: 0.340 0.474 0 1 0 
   - clients    0.088 0.283 0 1 0 
   - competitors 0.062 0.242 0 1 0 
   - consultants & laboratories 0.081 0.273 0 1 0 
   - PRCs 0.081 0.273 0 1 0 
   - other firms of the group  0.078 0.269 0 1 0 
   - providers  0.126 0.332 0 1 0 
   - technological centres 0.128 0.334 0 1 0 
   - universities 0.168 0.374 0 1 0 
Other firm characteristics (quantitative):      
Export intensity (Export over sales) 0.171   0.263 0 1 0.011 
External R&D Expenditures (K€) 235.7 2,239.1 0 54,800 0 
Internal R&D Expenditures  719.5 3,910.4  0 72,300.0 53.6 
Percentage of R&D employees (%) 43.1 42.0 0 100 38.3 
R&D intensity (K€ per employee) 7.0   27.8 0 1,268.4 0.8 
Size (Number of employees)  358.2 1,096.8 1 13,023 69 
Total R&D intensity (K€ per employee) 8.7   34.9 0 1,441.2 1.1 
Number of observations (firms) 13,546 (4,407)  
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Table A.2: Transition rates across participation status 
 
  Status in t  
Status in t-1 
Number of 
observations 
No 
public 
funding 
Only 
CDTI 
loan 
Only 
national 
subsidy 
Only  
European 
subsidy 
CDTI 
loan & 
national 
subsidy 
CDTI 
loan & 
European 
subsidy 
National 
& 
European 
subsidies 
All types 
of public 
funding 
 
No public funding 6,124 84.7 6.7 5.0 0.7 2.1 0.2 0.6 0.1 100 
Only CDTI loan 677 65.7 12.4 15.1 1.0 4.7 0.0 1.0 0.0 100 
Only national subsidy 1,009 45.3 9.2 28.1 1.4 12.7 0.3 2.9 0.2 100 
Only European subsidy 233 54.1 3.4 7.3 21.0 2.2 2.6 8.2 1.3 100 
CDTI loan & national subsidy 403 34.2 8.7 38.0 0.7 14.1 0.5 2.2 1.5 100 
CDTI loan & European subsidy 21 33.3 4.8 4.8 14.3 9.5 0.0 19.1 14.3 100 
National & European subsidies 218 13.8 3.2 15.6 10.6 4.6 0.9 47.7 3.7 100 
All types of public funding 48 10.4 4.2 14.6 8.3 2.1 2.1 31.3 27.1 100 
Total 8,733 73.2 7.3 10.4 1.7 4.2 0.3 2.5 0.5 100 
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Table A.3: Product innovation, process innovation and patents application.  
Probit model 
 
 Product  
innovation 
 Process  
innovation 
 Patents  
application 
 dy/dx  S.E.  dy/dx  S.E.  dy/dx  S.E.
Total R&D intensitya) 0.219 *** 0.006 0.154 *** 0.007  0.136 *** 0.006
        
High and medium-tech manufacturing sector 0.030 ** 0.012 -0.044 ** 0.017  0.007  0.009
High and medium-tech service sector -0.053 ** 0.022 -0.138 *** 0.020  -0.090 *** 0.017
Belonging to a group -0.034 ** 0.012 -0.004  0.013  -0.037 *** 0.009
Exporter (t-1) 0.147 *** 0.011 0.125 *** 0.010  0.065 *** 0.010
Foreign capital  -0.034 ** 0.017 -0.045 ** 0.015  -0.011  0.011
Public firm -0.012  0.041 0.040  0.037  -0.082 ** 0.037
Size (in logs.) 0.108 *** 0.004 0.097 *** 0.005  0.072 *** 0.005
Start-up 0.299 ** 0.099 0.158 *** 0.043  0.034  0.027
Log of Likelihood Function -4,852.5 -5,447.8  -3,373.2 
Number of observations 8,716 8,716  8,716 
 
Notes: a) The prediction of the total R&D intensity is obtained from estimations (3) and (4) in Table 4. S.E.: 
Bootstrapped standard errors. Marginal effects (dy/dx) are computed at sample means. For dummy variables, the 
marginal effect corresponds to change from 0 to 1. All regressions include a constant and time dummies for the 
years 2003 and 2004. Coefficients significant at 1%***, 5%**, 10%*. 
 
 
 
 
Table A.4: Product innovation, process innovation and patents application.  
IV Linear probability model 
 
 Product  
innovation 
 Process  
innovation 
 Patents  
application 
 dy/dx  S.E. dy/dx  S.E.  dy/dx  S.E.
Participation in CDTI loan programmea) 0.015 *** 0.002 0.009 *** 0.002  0.022 *** 0.003
Participation in national subsidy programmea) 0.004 ** 0.001 0.004 *** 0.001  -0.007 *** 0.002
Participation in European subsidy programmea) 0.004 * 0.002 0.002  0.002  0.017 *** 0.004
        
High and medium-tech manufacturing sector 0.020  0.026 -0.049 ** 0.019  -0.031  0.025
High and medium-tech service sector 0.028  0.034 -0.094 *** 0.019  0.002  0.037
Belonging to a group -0.022  0.017 0.006  0.015  -0.042 ** 0.021
Exporter (t-1) 0.058 ** 0.018 0.064 *** 0.017  -0.078 *** 0.023
Foreign capital  0.094 *** 0.023 0.041 ** 0.021  0.085 ** 0.026
Public firm -0.059  0.054 -0.003  0.041  -0.093 * 0.052
Size (in logs.) -0.027 *** 0.004 0.007 * 0.004  -0.020 *** 0.005
Start-up 0.127  0.079 0.099  0.067  0.079  0.111
Number of observations 8,716 8,716  8,716 
 
Notes: a) The instrumental variables are the prediction of the probability of participating in each programme 
obtained from Table 3 and the prediction of the total R&D intensity obtained from estimations (3) and (4) in 
Table 4. S.E.: Bootstrapped standard errors. All regressions include a constant and time dummies for the years 
2003 and 2004. Coefficients significant at 1%***, 5%**, 10%* 
  
 
